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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of the Massachusetts legislature. The conflict between the theory of this
statute and the public policy of New York which occurs on the question of
damages is then considerably more fundamental than the decision of the Court
indicates. The effect of impressing the lex loci delicti with the public policy
of the forum is to substantially reconstruct the Massachusetts statute from its
very foundations.
Another policy consideration is the effect, of the forum changing the
applicable law, on the parties. Declining to enforce a right created by foreign
law, however great the resulting inconvenience, in theory does not amount to
a deprivation of the right as the plaintiff may still have recourse to the foreign
court. The converse situation, expansion of a right derived from foreign law, is
quite a different matter, in view of the correlative broadening of the defend-
ant's liability. The same set of operative facts should not give rise to different
degrees and bases of liability depending solely on the forum in which liability
is judicially determined.
A possible alternative to the Kilberg dilemma would be legislation pro-
viding for a cause of action in contract, similar to the plaintiff's second count
here, with the damages being unlimited. Other alternatives are federal legisla-
tion or uniform state laws governing recovery for injuries resulting in death
received in an airplane crash. The basic problem, however, is not one for
judicial solution.
The Kilberg decision upholds the state's public policy of prohibiting the
imposition of limits on recovery of damages in wrongful death actions. How-
ever, by disregarding the Massachusetts Act's provision as to damages and
in its place applying New York's public policy, the Court is inviting forum-
shopping and defeating the objective of conflict of laws rules, uniformity of
result.40
P.W.D.
PUBLIC POLICY DID NOT BAR APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW IN CONTRACT
ACTION
In Haag v. Barnes,41 an action for support against the putative father of
an illegitimate child, the defense was an agreement between the parties for
support of the child, fully performed, and in which plaintiff relinquished the
right to bring any action for support. Since the agreement was not court ap-
proved as required by New York law,42 it would not bar the suit under the
internal law of New York. The agreement was made in Illinois, however, where
both parties resided at the time, and it specifically provided that it should be
40. Goodrich, supra note 1, § 4.
41. 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
42. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 121 and New York City Criminal Courts Act § 63 provide:
An agreement or compromise made by the mother .. .shall be binding only when
the court shall have determined that adequate provision has been made.
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interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of that state. Under Illinois
law, the agreement amounted to an absolute bar to suit.
4 3
The traditional rule is that the law governing a contract must be deter-
mined by the intent of the parties. 44 The intent of the parties is no longer
conclusive, however, and the courts will look to the law of the place having
the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.4 5 Under both tests the
Court of Appeals held that Illinois law was applicable.
In considering plaintiff's argument that public policy required the appli-
cation of New York law, the Court stated that the issue is not whether the
New York statute reflects a different public policy from that of the Illinois law,
but whether enforcement of the contract under Illinois law represents an affront
to our public policy.46 Moreover, it found that the agreement did in fact
satisfy the public policy of New York.
Bd.
FOREIGN DIVORCE ACTION NOT ENJOINED IF DECREE NOT ENTITLED TO FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT
In Arpels v. Arpels4 7 plaintiff sought to enjoin her husband from prose-
cuting a divorce action, based on alleged adultery, instituted by him in France.
Special Term granted a temporary injunction,48 but the Appellate Division
reversed and dismissed the complaint.49 The Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Court noted that the power to enjoin a person from resorting to a foreign court
is a power used sparingly inasmuch as it represents a challenge to the dignity
and authority of the tribunal. Thus, it is employed only if there is a danger
of fraud or gross wrong being perpetrated on the foreign court. The power is
further restricted in the case of a foreign divorce action where, even if a
serious impropriety would result from prosecution of the action, an injunction
will issue only if the ensuing decree would be entitled to full faith and credit.50
The Court found that there was no danger of fraud on the foreign court
since there was good reason to believe that the French court had jurisdiction
to hear the suit and render a binding judgment under French law. Even if
there was a possibility of fraud, however, plaintiff still would be unsuccessful.
It is well-established that a divorce decree, valid under the laws of one of the
states of the union, must be accorded full faith and credit by a sister state.51
43. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 106Y4, § 65.
44. Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 44 N.E. 959 (1896) ; Stumpf v. Haila-
han, 101 App. Div. 383, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1062 (1905), aff'd, 185 N.Y. 550, 77 N.E. 1196(1906).
45. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,
305 N.Y. 288, 113 N.E.2d 424 (1953).
46. Cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
47. 8 N.Y.2d 338, 207 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1960).
48. 17 Misc. 2d 471, 187 N.Y.S.2d 100 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
49. 9 A.D.2d 336, 193 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1st Dep't 1959).
50. See, Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955); Garvin v.
Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96, 96 N.E.2d 721 (1951).
51. Williams v. State of North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Garvin v. Garvin,
supra note 50.
